There
are few issues more important to the security of the United States than
the potential spread of nuclear weapons, or the potential for even more
destructive war in the Middle East. That’s why the United States
negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in the first
place.
The reality is clear. The JCPOA is working – that is a
view shared by our European allies, independent experts, and the current
U.S. Secretary of Defense. The JCPOA is in America’s interest – it has
significantly rolled back Iran’s nuclear program. And the JCPOA is a
model for what diplomacy can accomplish – its inspections and
verification regime is precisely what the United States should be
working to put in place with North Korea. Indeed, at a time when we are
all rooting for diplomacy with North Korea to succeed, walking away from
the JCPOA risks losing a deal that accomplishes – with Iran – the very
outcome that we are pursuing with the North Koreans.
That is why
today’s announcement is so misguided. Walking away from the JCPOA turns
our back on America’s closest allies, and an agreement that our
country’s leading diplomats, scientists, and intelligence professionals
negotiated. In a democracy, there will always be changes in policies and
priorities from one Administration to the next. But the consistent
flouting of agreements that our country is a party to risks eroding
America’s credibility, and puts us at odds with the world’s major
powers.
Debates in our country should be informed by facts,
especially debates that have proven to be divisive. So it’s important to
review several facts about the JCPOA.
First, the JCPOA was not
just an agreement between my Administration and the Iranian government.
After years of building an international coalition that could impose
crippling sanctions on Iran, we reached the JCPOA together with the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, the European Union, Russia, China, and
Iran. It is a multilateral arms control deal, unanimously endorsed by a
United Nations Security Council Resolution.
Second, the JCPOA
has worked in rolling back Iran’s nuclear program. For decades, Iran had
steadily advanced its nuclear program, approaching the point where they
could rapidly produce enough fissile material to build a bomb. The
JCPOA put a lid on that breakout capacity. Since the JCPOA was
implemented, Iran has destroyed the core of a reactor that could have
produced weapons-grade plutonium; removed two-thirds of its centrifuges
(over 13,000) and placed them under international monitoring; and
eliminated 97 percent of its stockpile of enriched uranium – the raw
materials necessary for a bomb. So by any measure, the JCPOA has imposed
strict limitations on Iran's nuclear program and achieved real results.
Third, the JCPOA does not rely on trust – it is rooted in the
most far-reaching inspections and verification regime ever negotiated in
an arms control deal. Iran’s nuclear facilities are strictly monitored.
International monitors also have access to Iran’s entire nuclear supply
chain, so that we can catch them if they cheat. Without the JCPOA, this
monitoring and inspections regime would go away.
Fourth, Iran
is complying with the JCPOA. That was not simply the view of my
Administration. The United States intelligence community has continued
to find that Iran is meeting its responsibilities under the deal, and
has reported as much to Congress. So have our closest allies, and the
international agency responsible for verifying Iranian compliance – the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Fifth, the JCPOA does
not expire. The prohibition on Iran ever obtaining a nuclear weapon is
permanent. Some of the most important and intrusive inspections codified
by the JCPOA are permanent. Even as some of the provisions in the JCPOA
do become less strict with time, this won’t happen until ten, fifteen,
twenty, or twenty-five years into the deal, so there is little reason to
put those restrictions at risk today.
Finally, the JCPOA was never intended to solve all of our problems with
Iran. We were clear-eyed that Iran engages in destabilizing behavior –
including support for terrorism, and threats toward Israel and its
neighbors. But that’s precisely why it was so important that we prevent
Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Every aspect of Iranian behavior
that is troubling is far more dangerous if their nuclear program is
unconstrained. Our ability to confront Iran’s destabilizing behavior –
and to sustain a unity of purpose with our allies – is strengthened with
the JCPOA, and weakened without it.
Because of these facts, I
believe that the decision to put the JCPOA at risk without any Iranian
violation of the deal is a serious mistake. Without the JCPOA, the
United States could eventually be left with a losing choice between a
nuclear-armed Iran or another war in the Middle East. We all know the
dangers of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon. It could embolden an already
dangerous regime; threaten our friends with destruction; pose
unacceptable dangers to America’s own security; and trigger an arms race
in the world’s most dangerous region. If the constraints on Iran’s
nuclear program under the JCPOA are lost, we could be hastening the day
when we are faced with the choice between living with that threat, or
going to war to prevent it.
In a dangerous world, America must be able to rely in part on strong,
principled diplomacy to secure our country. We have been safer in the
years since we achieved the JCPOA, thanks in part to the work of our
diplomats, many members of Congress, and our allies. Going forward, I
hope that Americans continue to speak out in support of the kind of
strong, principled, fact-based, and unifying leadership that can best
secure our country and uphold our responsibilities around the globe.